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Abstract.
Performance related pay has been extended to practically the whole of the Civil
Service over the last few years, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer recently
announced the Government's intention to enlarge its role even further. Almost no
serious work on seems to have been published on whether the existing systems
have succeeded. The present study, directed solely at the Inland Revenue, begins
to fill the gap.
Performance Pay was introduced for the majority of staff at the Inland Revenue
in 1988. The reason for doing this is not completely clear but the central
justification for performance related pay must surely be that it acts as a
motivator. We therefore wish to establish whether Revenue staff have been
motivated to improve the quality and quantity of their work in response to
Performance Pay. We surveyed the views of nearly 2,500 staff on the impact of
the Performance Pay system on their own behaviour and that of others.
Our first finding is that the majority of Revenue staff support the principle of
performance related pay but that a significant minority feels hostile to it. Our
second finding is that any positive motivational effects of Performance Pay have
been, at most, very modest among Revenue staff. Even worse, there is clear
evidence of some demotivation among staff. It is by no means implausible that
the net motivational effect has been negative.
The main reason for this failure to motivate looks to be that the allocation of
performance payments is seen by very many staff to be unfair. Awards are given
only to those who have received good appraisal ratings, but many of our
respondents feel that the appraisal system has been corrupted. A second reason
is that staff feel the amount of money involved in performance pay awards is
simply not large enough to justify a change in behaviour. A third reason is that
very many staff feel that they are already working to the right standard and that
they cannot improve. 
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This paper was produced as part of the Centre's Programme on Industrial
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1. Introduction.
Systems of performance related pay have been extended to practically the whole
of the Civil Service over the last few years, and are now widespread within the
public sector at large. It is still the case that for virtually all staff, the importance
of the performance related elements is small in relation to total pay but the
direction of change is unambiguous. Performance related pay in the public sector
is likely to become more extensive over time and to comprise a growing part of
the typical public sector worker's pay packet. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer recently underlined this, and gave an insight
into some of the accompanying reasoning of the present Government on this
issue, in his reply to a Parliamentary question  (24.7.91). He noted that:-
"It is important that pay systems in the public sector should make a regular
and direct link between a person's contribution to the standards of
service provided and his or her reward.....Pay has an important part
to play in raising the quality and improving the responsiveness of
public services - a key theme in the Citizens' Charter..... The
Government now wants to introduce more flexible pay regimes for the
Civil Service, both nationally and locally.....The new pay systems
must.....be demonstrably beneficial to the citizen, fair to the employee
and linked to the delivery of high quality public services.....This means
developing pay structures which reward good performance and
penalise bad.....the Government has concluded that the [existing pay]
agreements as they stand do not provide a framework that is fully
capable of meeting the needs of the Nineties..... I therefore propose to
put in place a range of forms of performance related pay in order to
achieve a closer link between performance and reward both for
individuals and for groups of staff. This will be an important means
of securing the objective of improving the quality of public services,
which is at the heart of the Citizens' Charter Programme. Over time,
performance will come to determine a larger proportion of the paybill
without performance pay becoming a disguised way of providing
unacceptably high increases in the pay bill"
These views are not new. When reviewing the experience of performance related
pay for the senior grades of the Civil Service, the 1990 Review Body of Top
Salaries stressed management's goal of encouraging and rewarding good
performance as the purpose behind relating pay to performance. But before
Governments commit themselves to enlarge the role for performance related pay
in the Civil Service, it would seem only prudent to consider whether its
application to the Civil Service so far has been a success. Only as a result of
careful empirical analysis can the authorities be confident that performance
related pay in general, and specific schemes in particular, work in the Civil
Service. In fact, almost no serious work on this question seems to have been
published, although much may have been done behind the scenes. The present
study begins to fill that gap.
Performance Related Pay in the Inland Revenue.
The precise form of performance related pay varies significantly amongst the
different parts of the Civil Service, but the objectives behind its growth seem to
be fairly common to the different parts. The current system in operation in the
Inland Revenue ('Performance Pay') was introduced in the 1988 Pay Agreement
, which had a number of objectives laid down in its preamble, as follows:-1
i) to secure the confidence of the public in the system for determining the
pay of the staff covered by this Agreement by providing that their pay
shall be such as, taking one year with another, to recruit, retain and
motivate civil servants of appropriate calibre to perform efficiently the
duties required of them;
ii) to secure the confidence of the civil servants in the Inland Revenue at all
levels covered by this Agreement that their pay will be determined
fairly;
iii) to enable the Government to reconcile its responsibilities for the control
of public expenditure with its responsibilities as an employer;
iv) to provide greater flexibility in the management and use of the staff
concerned and better opportunities for career development;
v) to provide for equity of treatment while also providing for flexibility to
deal with particular pay problems;
vi) to link the pay and the associated personnel management arrangements;
vii) to provide incentives for improving and maintaining efficiency in the
Inland Revenue;
viii) to reward sustained high performance;
ix) to maintain the openness of all the rules and provisions of the pay,
promotion and career development arrangements.
These objectives refer to the Agreement as a whole and are not confined to
Performance Pay, nor are they very explicit about the nature of the link between
pay and performance. The relationship is indeed a complex one, and is hotly
debated in the scientific literature. This is partly because of conflicting views
among researchers as to the nature and determinants of employee motivation, but
also because of the difficulty of measuring performance, and indeed, of deciding
which of its dimensions are the critical ones. 
Yet despite these problems, introducing any scheme of performance related pay
makes little sense unless it motivates staff to work better in some respect or other.
It is implausible, for example, that its objective should be simply to reward past
performance unless this were also thought to encourage good performance in the
future. The central justification for performance related pay must surely be that
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it acts as a motivator.
The form of the Inland Revenue's system of Performance Pay is that staff who are
judged to have performed sufficiently well in their work can be awarded
additional pay increments. The judgments about staff performance are made
through a system of staff appraisal, the current version of which dates from the
mid-1980s and leads to individual staff being rated annually on a scale of one to
five, the so-called "Box markings". 
The appraisal system involves a number of stages. First there is an annual
discussion of individual work objectives (the 'job plan') for the  coming year
between each member of staff and his or her immediate supervisor, the
'Reporting Officer'. Secondly, there is supposed to be frequent review of
achievements in relation to this job plan, which may in turn lead to the plan
being revised. Finally, the Reporting Officer is asked to rate the performance of
the staff member at the end of the year according to thirteen different criteria:
Standard of work a) quality
b) quantity
Personal skills c) planning
d) problem solving
e) negotiation (if applicable)
f) decision making
Management g) of staff (if applicable)
h) of other resources
Communication i) oral
j) written
Working relationships k) with colleagues
l) with the public
Knowledge m) professional and technical knowledge
(Source: Inland Revenue Staff Report Form E1A (C&T)).
These ratings, plus impressions from the preceding discussions concerning the job
plan, then provide a basis for the overall Box marking each member of staff
receives.
An important check on the whole process is provided by the "Counter-signing
Officer" who has to vet the reports of each Reporting Officer, and who may ask
for justification of particular Box markings given. Clearly, this makes it possible
to achieve consistency in appraisal standards among Reporting Officers, but staff
may also feel that it enables management to overrule the award of good Box
markings for reasons that have nothing to do with individual performance.
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The outcome of this process is illustrated by the results for 1988 in Table 1. A Box
1 marking is awarded for outstanding performance "well above the requirements
of the grade and consistently maintained"; a Box 2 is awarded for performance
"significantly above requirements"; a Box 3 is given for performance which "fully
meets the normal requirements of the grade", a Box 4 for performance which is
"not fully up to requirements", and a Box 5 for "unacceptable" performance.
Table 1. Appraisal Box Markings by Grade: 1988, percentages.
Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5
Inspector (S) 11.5 61.0 27.0 0.5 -
Inspector 6.0 49.0 43.5 1.5 -
RE 5.0 45.0 48.0 2.0 -
RO 4.5 37.5 55.5 2.5 -
RA 14.0 42.5 41.5 1.5 -
Total 7.0 43.0 48.0 2.0 -
RO Male 5.0 34.9 57.5 2.1 0.5
RO Female 4.7 37.7 56.3 1.1 0.2
Note: the following abbreviations are used in this and subsequent tables: RE,
Revenue Executive; RO, Revenue Officer; RA, Revenue Assistant.
Source: IRSF Assessment Dec. 1990, based on data provided by the Inland
Revenue.
It should be stressed that, since 1988 and for all grades, the proportions of
Revenue staff awarded Box 1s or Box 2s  have significantly declined. Thus, the
proportion of staff on grade Inspector (S) who were given a Box 1 fell from 12%
in 1988 to 5% in 1991; the corresponding figures for Box 2s were 63% and 43% .2
The reasons for this decline are not clear but it seems most unlikely that it reflects
a widespread decline in staff performance. It is true that Revenue staff had been
paid somewhat more than comparable Civil Servants for a number of years; it is
also true that Civil Service staff outside the Revenue seem often to qualify more
easily for Performance Pay Awards, reflecting perhaps the different rules on
performance related pay in their particular Pay Agreements. It is possible that the
Revenue has been using its system of Performance Pay to deny high Box
markings and control its wage bill more aggressively than have other Civil
Service employers. 
According to the Revenue Pay Agreement, staff at the maximum of the
incremental pay scale for their grade qualify for a Performance Pay Award if they
achieve either a Box 1 marking, or two consecutive Box 2s. Those not on their
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scale maximum may be made a Performance Pay Award only if they gain a Box
1.
The form taken by Performance Pay is that of additional increments. Box 1s who
are not on the scale maximum for their grade move up their scale more quickly
with an accelerated increment; those who are on the scale maximum get "range
points" beyond the maximum of the pay scale for a particular grade. Staff may
earn up to three such range points. If they gain a Box 1 marking they move up
a whole increment on their pay spine. If they gain two consecutive Box 2s, they
move up the equivalent of half an increment . The absolute size of increments3
varies by grade. For Typists and Revenue Assistants, the maximum reward for
sustained outstanding performance under Performance Pay would be three whole
increments over their scale maximum, a pay rise over time of up to 22% for a
succession of Box 1s. For Inspectors, the corresponding increase would be 12%.
The intermediate grades of Revenue Officers and Revenue Executives respectively
could earn an extra 20% and 15%. A succession of six Box 2s would qualify for
roughly half these amounts . 4
This form of reward means that the performance related pay element is virtually
permanent, i.e. they are analogous to normal service-related increments. They
could in principle be withdrawn after a period of unsatisfactory performance but
this is, apparently, almost unknown . They are however 'clawed back' on5
promotion to a higher grade as an officer's range point is translated into a higher
initial point on the scale for the new grade.
Apart from recognising the need to manage staff effectively, the 1988 Pay
Agreement also recognised the Government's need to reconcile its responsibilities
for the control of public expenditure. The Agreement therefore set a ceiling on the
total amount which the Revenue could award each year for Performance Pay. In
the Parliamentary Answer quoted above, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated
his intention that Performance Pay should not become a disguised way of
providing "unacceptably high increases in the pay bill". The 1988 Pay Agreement
states that "it is expected that if reporting and marking criteria are properly
observed the cost" of Performance Pay "will not exceed (nor fall substantially
short of) the cost of giving 25 per cent of the staff in the grades covered a range
increase on the spine which they are on.." (para 13 vi). A cost ceiling of similar
magnitude was applied in a number of other Civil Service performance related
pay schemes in force at that time.
The effect of such a "quota" on the amounts paid out has evidently given rise to
problems with performance related pay schemes in other parts of the Civil
Service. For example, the Review Body of Top Salaries looked at the arguments
for increasing the eligibility limit from 25% to 35% for senior grades in the Civil
Service (Grades 3 to 5), pointing out in particular the need to motivate the
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majority of staff who are "fully satisfactory performers" (RBTS 1990) but who
would not be awarded performance pay.
Currently, between about 15% and 30% of staff in the grades organised by the
Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) are in receipt of Performance Pay
depending on grade: about 15% of Revenue Assistants, and about 30% of
Revenue Executives are getting it, with Inspectors and Revenue Officers in an
intermediate position.
The present enquiry.
It was noted above that the central justification for performance related pay must
be that it acts as a motivator. This study seeks to establish whether this has been
the case for Performance Pay in the Inland Revenue. Specifically it seeks to
establish whether the staff there in the grades represented by the IRSF have been
motivated to improve the quality and quantity of their work in response to
Performance Pay. It cannot be claimed that this represents a complete evaluation
of Performance Pay. That would be a formidable undertaking, and would require,
at a minimum, unambiguous and 'objective' measures of performance, such as
changes in the amount of post dealt with, or the number of pages typed. These
could be calculated for individual members of staff or for groups, and
comparisons might be made cross-sectionally or over time. The measures would
also have to be a complete rather than a partial statement of performance, which
implies different measures for different grades and tasks, and they would each
have to be properly weighted according to their importance. All this would pose
especially difficult problems given that the quality of performance is assuming
so much importance but is so variable and hard to define.
We have not been so ambitious as this. Instead, we seek to probe a more limited
question concerning the views of Revenue staff, from Revenue Typist to Senior
Inspector, about how they believe Performance Pay has affected various aspects
of their work, and that of their colleagues. This, we hope, will allow us to address
two principal questions: (i) has Performance Pay succeeded in motivating
Revenue staff, and (ii) why or why not?
Our work was initially stimulated by an approach from the IRSF. We
subsequently approached the Inland Revenue official side to ask whether they
wished to make it a jointly sponsored union-management study. The official side
chose not to participate, but they did provide a great deal of valuable help with
background information, and they cooperated fully with the research. In
particular, they agreed to draw the sample to our specifications from their
personnel records, and they distributed the questionnaires through their internal
mailing service. The authors would like to express their very sincere thanks to the
official side for all their assistance.
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A draft questionnaire was piloted on, and small group discussions were held
with, about 40 Revenue staff at one of their offices. The piloting and the group
discussions had a significant impact on the final form of the questionnaire, which,
together with frequency responses, is displayed in full in Appendix 1. In the
summer of 1991 the questionnaire was sent to 4,000 Revenue staff in the grades
represented by the IRSF. The method of drawing the sample meant that both
members and non-members of the IRSF were surveyed. It is therefore very
unlikely to be the case that the views reported below are those of union members
alone. The returns were anonymous and confidential, and were returned in sealed
envelopes via the Revenue's internal postal system but addressed to us at the
LSE. All the returned questionnaires that reached us did so in unopened
envelopes and have been seen only by the researchers and those who punched
the data into the computer. There is no reason to believe that the replies were
influenced by the possibility of favourable or unfavourable judgments from either
management or the IRSF.
Of the 4,000 questionnaires sent out, 2,423 usable questionnaires were returned,
giving a sample response rate of slightly above 60%. This is a very satisfactory
response rate, especially as it was not in practice possible to send out reminders,
and it may well reflect the interest which staff have in the issues being explored.
Two sampling decisions were made prior to drawing the sample. First, the survey
was confined to those in the Taxes and Collection Sections of the Revenue. The
remaining Sections are relatively small, which is why they had to be omitted from
the survey, but in what follows their omission could conceivably be important.
It must be noted, however, that our results very strongly suggest that staff views
on the impact of Performance Pay are not different as between Taxes and
Collection. We therefore feel more confident that the omission of the other
Sections does not lead to any significant overall distortion. The second sampling
decision was to sample the different job grades disproportionately, taking a
higher fraction of staff in the smaller grades. This was done in order to maximise
the chance of obtaining statistically significant results with respect to job grade
within our overall sample size. It also turned out to be the case that response
rates to the survey varied by job grade, with significantly higher response rates
coming from more senior staff. In order to obtain a representative picture of all
staff in the population, therefore, the results were subsequently re-weighted to
compensate both for the oversampling and for the differential response rates. All
the results reported below use the re-weighted data.
Overall, the sample provides a good fit of the population values according to a
number of characteristics of the Revenue's staff that could be checked
independently; here we looked at grade, gender, length of service, region and
section (Taxes and Collection). Also, and most importantly, there seems to be a
good fit by Box marking, which suggests that the staff who replied had neither
done particularly well nor particularly badly in comparison with staff as a whole.
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There seems to be no reason to doubt the representativeness of our data, whether
by employment characteristics or by experience of the Performance Pay
mechanics. Detailed figures on 'fit' are shown in Appendix 2.
2. What do Revenue staff think about the principle of performance related pay?
Many workers are suspicious of, or hostile to, the principle of relating some part
of their pay to performance. Others see nothing wrong with it or are actively in
favour. Our first task was to gauge the views of the Inland Revenue staff on this
prior issue of principle. Table 2 highlights some of our results.
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Performance Pay is good in principle (Q1) 57 40
On balance, for all its faults, it is better to have 
Performance Pay than not (Q7) 49 44
The idea of Performance Pay is fundamentally unfair (Q2) 36 58
These results are not far out of line with those in the Next Steps report (Efficiency
Unit 1988), which reported that 70% of Civil Servants supported the general
principle of rewarding good performance with better pay (Next Steps, para 17).
Inland Revenue staff look to be somewhat less favourably inclined than this but,
on balance, are clearly in favour of the principle of some linking of pay to
performance. As is documented below, however, many of them have deep
reservations about the operation of these links in the existing Revenue scheme.
It may well be that these reservations have caused some people to be more hostile
to the principle than they would have been if the operation of the Revenue
scheme was seen to be more satisfactory. This interpretation is supported by the
different response to the first two statements in Table 2. The second statement
effectively asks respondents to take both principle and practice into account, and
generates less support for Performance Pay.
It is also worth emphasising that a significant minority of Revenue staff have very
strong objections to the principle of performance related pay. Those who
expressed strong disagreement with the principle of performance related pay in
the above statements were always more numerous than those who expressed
strong agreement.
Our conclusion is that a majority of Revenue staff supports the principle of
performance related pay but that a significant minority feels hostile to it.
3. Has Performance Pay motivated staff at the Inland Revenue?
This is a central focus of our research, but it is not a straightforward question to
answer. We must first consider what 'motivation' means, and then consider where
motivational change might be looked for.
- 10 -
Motivation does not automatically translate into performance. People can be
highly motivated but still perform badly because of a range of impediments, e.g.
poor management, inadequate training or obsolete equipment. Equally, people
can be poorly motivated but perform well, for example if there is very tight
management. Motivation, then, is something that can lead to better performance,
but only when other conditions are met. We treat it as a willingness or
preparedness to do something, which means that it is a state of mind. Sometimes,
researchers make inferences about levels of motivation purely by observing
performance. This can be legitimate but, equally, can lead to difficulties when
other things are changing at the same time and are independently affecting
performance. We have chosen a different approach and have measured
motivation as the responses of staff to a variety of statements about themselves
and their fellow employees. 
The second problem is motivation to do what? The ultimate issue is whether
performance at work will change because of a prior change in motivation. But
performance covers a wide variety of behaviour, in the Revenue as elsewhere. In
the case of the Inland Revenue, Performance Pay can be awarded only when staff
receive a sufficiently high overall score in an appraisal process which formally
takes into account up to thirteen aspects of behaviour (see above) . It was7
therefore felt appropriate to ask staff about most of these aspects of performance
when trying to discover the motivational effects of performance related pay. 
Some of the thirteen are seen to be more important than others. Discussions with
a variety of people in the Revenue led us to the view that the two most important
dimensions of performance for appraisal purposes were usually thought to be the
quantity and the quality of the work done, but we explored a number of the
others too. We also looked for motivational change with respect to some aspects
of performance not located in the appraisal form. Table 3 shows some results. The
form of all the statements was, has performance pay raised your motivation
to......, or given you an incentive to.....?
Table 3. Staff assessment of their own motivational responses to performance pay.
Percentages
Performance Pay has led you to:
Yes No
improve the quality of your work (Q31) 12 80
increase the quantity of your work (Q32) 14 78
work harder (Q28) 9 71
work beyond the job requirements (Q17) 21 70
give sustained high performance (Q20) 27 63
improve your priorities at work (Q22) 22 64
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show more initiative (Q19) 27 61
express yourself with greater clarity (Q25) 13 67
be more effective in dealing with the public (Q27) 9 68
improve your sensitivity towards colleagues (Q23) 14 63
We also asked a general question about whether people thought that Performance
Pay had raised their motivation at work. 12% said that it had, while 76% said that
it had not.
It is clear from these results that, on their own assessment, relatively few Inland
Revenue staff members feel that Performance Pay has provided them with an
incentive, or motivation, to change their behaviour at work at all significantly.
The results are especially disappointing for the crucial areas of motivating staff
to improve the quality and quantity of their work, with fewer than 15%
perceiving any positive change. It is also notable that staff feel that Performance
Pay has had a negligible effect in motivating them to become more effective in
their dealings with the public, with only 9% seeing a change. This last result is
potentially of great importance because of the Government's hopes recently laid
out in the Citizens' Charter.
It is possible that individuals are not always the best judges of their own
behaviour, or indeed of their motivation. An alternative source of evidence is the
judgment of those Inland Revenue staff who have to carry out staff appraisals,
i.e. the Reporting Officers. We asked these, about 20% of our total sample, to
respond to a number of statements on how they thought Performance Pay had
affected staff. The results are highlighted in Table 4.




Performance Pay has caused many staff to
work beyond the requirements of their job (Q67) 15 79
Performance Pay has led many staff to give
sustained high performance at work (Q69) 14 77
Performance Pay has helped to increase the
quality of the work of many staff (Q70) 10 82
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Performance Pay has led to an increase in the
quantity of the work of many staff (Q71) 22 71
Performance Pay has made many staff more
committed to their work (Q72) 12 79
These results certainly give no comfort to those who feel that staff might have
understated motivational change. They fully confirm the earlier results that
Performance Pay has had a very limited effect on positively motivating Inland
Revenue staff. Indeed, the Reporting Officers were, if anything, even more
sceptical of the system's success in this respect. Only on the impact of
Performance Pay on the quantity of work done were Reporting Officers even a
little more sanguine than staff as a whole.
So far we have been looking for the existence of positive motivational effects.
There must, however, be the possibility that at least some Revenue staff have
found the new arrangements demotivating. This might happen because some
think the whole principle is unfair or because they feel, rightly or wrongly, that
they have been cheated out of an award to which they feel entitled. One pointer
in this direction is the element of strong disagreement with the principle of
performance related pay, noted above in the discussion of Table 2. Another might
be inferred from the detailed results lying behind that Table. If someone disagrees
with a statement that Performance Pay has had a positive motivational effect, he
or she might believe either that it has had no effect at all or that it has had a
negative, demotivating one. Those who just express disagreement might feel that
it has had no effect. Those who express strong disagreement may well be
indicating the stronger negative effect of demotivation. It is notable that for many
of the statements in Table 2, the number of people who expressed strong
disagreement exceeded the total of those who expressed any measure of
agreement at all. We would not wish to push this inferential line of reasoning too
far but neither do we think that it is entirely without force.
The likelihood of an element of demotivation is also indicated by the responses
to some of the statements in the first section of the questionnaire. There we asked
staff to respond to a series of statements about the effect of Performance Pay not
on themselves but on staff as a whole. Some highlights are given in Table 5.
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Table 5. Staff views on some effects of Performance Pay of staff as a whole.
percentages
Yes No
Performance Pay has helped to undermine
staff morale (Q16) 55 25
Performance Pay has caused jealousies
between staff (Q14) 62 21
Performance Pay has made staff less
willing to assist colleagues (Q4) 26 53
With a majority agreeing that the scheme had undermined morale or caused
jealousies between staff, and a quarter agreeing that Performance Pay had made
staff less willing to assist one another, the likelihood of some counter-productive
demotivation is evident. 
Our overall conclusion is that the positive motivational effects of Performance
Pay, as it has been practised in the Revenue, have been at most very modest. It
is hard to see that they have been felt to any degree by more than a small
minority of staff. Further, the number who felt motivated to a powerful degree,
as shown by the number who expressed strong agreement with any of the
relevant statements, was always negligible. Even worse, there is clear evidence
of some demotivation. Although we cannot be sure of this, it is by no means
implausible that the net motivational effect so far has been negative.
4. How motivation was affected for different categories of staff.
The survey enables us to explore how different categories of staff judge the effects
of Performance Pay. To do this, we report results for staff differentiated by their
gender, their grade, their length of service in the Inland Revenue, by whether
they have received a Performance Pay award, by whether they are on the
maximum of their pay scale, by their latest overall Box marking and by their
latest promotability rating. We also looked at whether their views varied by their
area of work, and by whether they worked in Taxes or Collection, but a
preliminary analysis revealed no differences in staff evaluation of performance
pay between these characteristics.
Gender. Staff of both sexes showed very little positive motivational response as
a result of Performance Pay, but female staff were slightly more positive, or
slightly less negative, than their male colleagues. Table 6  shows some results on
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the percentages agreeing with our questions .8
Women were a little more likely to believe that performance pay had caused
jealousies among the staff, but both sexes thought equally that it had helped to
undermine staff morale. The differences on how Performance Pay had affected
them personally were small, but where they existed, women had a slightly more
favourable (slightly less unfavourable) response. These results may be less to do
with gender as such than with other factors like grade. 





16 Made morale decline 55 56
14 Has caused jealousies 64 59
32 More willing to raise quantity 14 14
31 More willing to raise quality 13 11
30 Raised my motivation 14 9
28 More willing to work harder 20 15
27 More effective with the public 9 7
25 Express myself more clearly 15 11
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 16 10
22 Get my priorities right 23 19
20 Sustained high performance 29 21
19 Encouraged my initiative 29 24
Grade. We found clear differences by grade in the impact of Performance Pay on
motivation. Table 7 shows some results. More than half of the staff in all job
grades think that Performance Pay has caused jealousies in the workplace, and,
with the exception of RAs, the same is true concerning the effects on staff morale.
There is no very clear tendency for adverse judgements about the effect of work
relations to increase or decrease with grade, except for the somewhat lower figure
for RAs.
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Table 7.  Staff judgements on motivational effects of Performance Pay by job
grade.
Percentages of staff agreeing
Question Job Grade
Insp (S) Insp RE RO RA RT
19 Encouraged my initiative 20 18 18 25 40 37
20 Sustained high performance 22 17 19 25 34
41
22 Get my priorities right 20 16 15 20 29 29
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 11 10 13 12
16 20
25 Express myself more clearly 9 9 9 11 20
22
27 More effective with the public 3 5 4 10
13 1
28 More willing to work harder 14 12 11 15 29
28
30 Raised my motivation 10 9 6 11 18 22
31 More willing to raise quality 11 11 8 13 17
13
32 More willing to raise quantity 13 13 10 14
18 17
14 Has caused jealousies 58 63 65 63 55 66
16 Made morale decline 56 55 62 58 46 55
Turning to judgements about personal motivation effect of Performance Pay, staff
in the less senior grades report a more positive motivational response towards
Performance Pay. This is never expressed as outright enthusiasm, but
Performance Pay does seem to have had a bigger impact on staff in the less
senior grades. There appears to be something of a divide between Revenue
Executives and above, and Revenue Officers and below in terms of its effects on
personal motivation. Revenue Typists and Revenue Assistants showed the
strongest positive motivational effects, although even on the question for which
their agreement was highest ("has encouraged me to show more initiative") the
"disagrees" outnumbered the "agrees" by about ten percentage points.
We cannot be sure why this relationship exists. One possibility is that, as a
percentage of salary, a Performance Pay award is more valuable for staff on the
lower grades. As we noted above, Revenue Typists can in theory eventually earn
as much as 22% more through Performance Pay, as compared with only 12% for
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senior Inspectors. This argument, however, must be heavily qualified by the fact
that Box 1 and 2 markings are not given evenly across grades. The monetary
incentive is clearly a product of both its size and the likelihood  of getting it.
Another possible reason for the differential motivational response by grade is that
many in senior grades have a somewhat different view of their work than those
in the junior grades. They may, for example, already have somewhat higher levels
of motivation, making the impact of Performance Pay more marginal.
Length of service. Length of service too is correlated with the motivational
response to Performance Pay, with those who have been with the Revenue for a
relatively long time being less likely to report a positive motivational response.
Table 8 shows some results.
Table 8.  Staff judgements on motivational effects of Performance Pay by length
of service.
Percentages of staff agreeing
Length of Service in IR (years)
<5 5- 9 10- 14 15- 19 >=20
19 Encouraged my initiative 42 23 27 18 21
20 Sustained high performance 34 26 26 21 21
22 Get my priorities right 29 19 22 17 19
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 15 11 12 1 3
16
25 Express myself more clearly 20 13 10 8 14
2 7 M o r e  effective with the public 13 8 6 5
7
28 More willing to work harder 30 16 17 10 15
30 Raised my motivation 19 11 11 6 11
3 1 M o r e  willing to raise quality 19 11 12 8
10
32 More willing to raise quantity 19 15 14 1 0
12
14 Has caused jealousies 48 58 67 69 72
16 Made morale decline 41 52 61 62 64
As can be seen, the longer staff have been with the Revenue, the more likely they
are to feel that Performance Pay has caused jealousies among the staff, and has
led to a decline in morale. Likewise, the less time staff have been with the
Revenue, the more likely they are to believe that Performance Pay has increased
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their own motivation. But once again, although the differences by length of
service are quite strong, even short service staff are more likely to judge that it
has had no substantial effect.
The three characteristics discussed so far interact to some extent, as there are
fewer women employed in the higher grades; also, because of the importance of
internal promotion, there are more short service staff among the lower grades.
Multiple regression analysis (not reported here) suggests that job grade continues
to exert a distinct effect on motivation, and that for some measures of motivation,
but by no means all, so too does gender. However, length of service seems not
to have a reliable effect once other factors are taken into account.
Performance Pay awards, and being on the top of the pay scale. It might be
expected that staff who have received a Performance Pay award might be more
favourably inclined to the system and report a greater motivational change. The
same might also be expected from those who are at the top of their pay scale,
because for them Box 2 markings will bring an award. As Table 9 shows, these
expectations are borne out.
Whether or not staff have received a Performance Pay award, and whether or not
they are on the maximum of their scale, more than half of our respondents
normally believe that Performance Pay has caused jealousies, and contributed to
a decline in morale. Even on the one exception, the percentage of "agrees" still
considerably outnumbers the "disagrees". Turning to the effects on personal
motivation, having received an award does seem to be associated with heightened
motivation as compared with the others. Again, however, even among those who
have received an award, the majority believe that it has had little effect.
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Table 9.  Staff judgements on the motivational effects of Performance Pay by
whether they have received an award and whether they are on the maximum for
their scale.
Percentages of staff agreeing
Performance On pay max
Pay award
Yes No Yes No
19 Encouraged my initiative 31 25 35 24
20 Sustained high performance 34 22 30 24
22 Get my priorities right 27 19 26 19
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 17 12 15 13
25 Express myself more clearly 16 12 18 12
27 More effective with the public 9 7 12 6
28 More willing to work harder 21 17 25 15
30 Raised my motivation 15 10 16 10
31 More willing to raise quality 14 11 18 10
32 More willing to raise quantity 17 13 18 13
14 Has caused jealousies 66 60 54 66
16 Made morale decline 50 59 47 60
Note: some caution should be attached to the Pay Max question owing to the
possibility that some respondents may have misreported.
Box markings and promotability markings. In line with these results, it would be
expected that those with higher Box markings would report more motivational
change in response to Performance Pay. Most of the respondents knew their latest
Box Marking, although a greater proportion did not know their promotability
marking, probably because they were new staff, or in junior grades and not
interested.
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Table 10. Staff judgements on motivational effects of Performance Pay by latest
Box Marking
Percentages of staff agreeing
Boxmark
1 2 3
19 Encouraged my initiative 43 31 21
20 Sustained high performance 50 31 19
22 Get my priorities right 32 25 17
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 20 16 12
25 Express myself more clearly 21 15 11
27 More effective with the public 14 8 7
28 More willing to work harder 27 21 14
30 Raised my motivation 23 15 8
31 More willing to raise quality 21 14 10
32 More willing to raise quantity 18 16 12
14 Has caused jealousies 62 64 63
16 Made morale decline 40 51 63
Note: the numbers obtaining Box Markings of four and below were too small for
reliable analysis.
Although reports of jealousies did not vary with box marking, those who had
received a high box marking were much less likely to judge that Performance Pay
had caused a decline in morale. This may reflect the judgements of a large
number of the Revenue Assistants and Typists and of shorter service staff who
obtained Box 1s. Among Box 1s, this was the only question of those analysed here
for which positive judgements were neck and neck with negative ones.
As concerns individual motivation, receiving a Box 1 or 2 has a powerful effect
as compared with a Box 3: receiving a Box 1 makes it twice as likely that staff
will report increased motivation. Half of those getting a Box 1 report that it
encouraged them to give "sustained high performance at work". However, it must
be disappointing for management in the Revenue that even on this question,
nearly half of the staff with Box 1s (44%) disagreed that Performance Pay had had
any effect of this kind.
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Table 11.  Staff judgements on motivational effects of Performance Pay by  their
latest Promotability Marking
Percentages of staff agreeing
Promotability rating
1 2 3 4 5
19 Encouraged my initiative 30 32 27 22 25
20 Sustained high performance 36 31 24 18 25
22 Get my priorities right 27 25 19 19 20
23 Made more sensitive to workmates 15 19 12 10
13
25 Express myself more clearly 16 16 12 10 13
27 More effective with the public 11 8 9 5
8
28 More willing to work harder 20 22 19 14 17
30 Raised my motivation 19 16 13 8 10
31 More willing to raise quality 16 14 13 12
11
32 More willing to raise quantity 12 16 16 14
12
14 Has caused jealousies 63 63 62 61 62
16 Made morale decline 47 54 56 60 56
Staff's promotability marking bears a similar relationship with judgments about
motivation to that found for box marking except that it is less striking. One
reason may be because fewer staff in the junior grades reported their
promotability marking, and it is these who seem to have been most motivated by
Performance Pay.
The overall picture is that, on our measures, Performance Pay has succeeded in
motivating a small percentage of the staff, particularly among the most junior
grades, and among those with the shortest service. However, even among these
groups, the majority of staff replied that there had been no motivational effect to
most of the questions. Among the more senior grades and the longer serving
staff, the effects on motivation were generally the weakest, and the reports of
jealousy and lower morale associated with Performance Pay were the most
frequent.
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5. Why does the Inland Revenue system of Performance Pay fail to motivate
staff?
There are many theories purporting to explain motivation, or the lack of it. Our
data allow us to use two of these to shed light on why Performance Pay in the
Revenue seems to be having so small a motivational impact.
One theory, expectancy theory, stresses the importance of a series of links
between behaviour and the rewards accruing to that behaviour. For there to a be
a heightened motivation to perform, someone:- 
(a) has to feel able to change his or her behaviour, 
(b) has to feel confident that a change in the behaviour would reliably
produce the rewards, and 
(c) has to value the rewards sufficiently to justify the change in behaviour.
Our results suggest that these three conditions are not all met for a large number
of Revenue staff. Expectancy theory would therefore point to only modest
motivational change.
Do staff feel that they can change their behaviour? We asked (Question 41)
whether people felt capable of doing what is necessary to get an overall Box 1 or
2 marking in the future. This, it will be recalled, is a necessary condition if a
Performance Pay Award is to be made. Only 6% felt that they were not capable
of such a performance level, as against 81% who believed that they were. The first
condition of expectancy theory was, therefore, clearly met. 
Are staff confident that a change in behaviour will reliably produce the rewards?
No fewer than 45% of our respondents were of the view that, even if their
performance was good enough to merit a Box 1 or 2, it was doubtful that one
would be awarded; only 40% believed that a good enough performance would
produce the correct Box Marking (Question 44). This belief, whether justified or
not, substantially reduces staff motivation to change their behaviour. 
Do staff value the rewards sufficiently? Obviously, most staff want the money
that a Performance Pay award brings. The key question is whether the amounts
involved justify, in their minds, the extra effort involved. This condition cannot
be entirely divorced from the preceding one because the expected value of the
award depends partly on its size and partly on the likelihood of getting it. The
responses to Question 42 give some idea of staff views on the size of the awards.
Only 17% of our respondents felt that the financial reward from Performance Pay
was a sufficient inducement for them to change their behaviour; 71% felt that it
was insufficient.
Thus, two of expectancy theory's three conditions seem not to be met for the
Revenue's system of Performance Pay, which provides a strong reason for its
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failure to motivate staff. Other findings from the survey reinforce this conclusion
and point to possible reforms that should be contemplated if motivational change
is to be secured. Perhaps the single most important issue here is not so much the
amount of money involved but the way it is allocated via the appraisal system.
The first Part of our questionnaire asked a number of questions about the
appraisal system in the Revenue. Table 12 highlights some results.
Table 12. Staff views on the Revenue's appraisal system.
percentages
Yes No
Performance Pay has made staff question
the fairness of the appraisal system (Q12) 87 5
Staff are frequently denied the Box Marking
they deserve because of a quota system (Q11) 74 10
A good appraisal is too often overruled
by someone higher up (Q5) 63 16
People get a good Box Marking not so much because
of their performance but because managers
want to reward their favourites (Q9) 35 45
There is obviously a consistency of response between these answers and those
referring to individual feelings as to whether they would get the Box marking
they felt they deserved if they were produce the appropriate performance. There
is a widespread doubt about the fairness of the appraisal system. Worse, there is
manifestly a view that the system of Performance Pay has undermined the
integrity of the long-standing and well-established appraisal system. As we noted
above, the mechanics of Performance Pay were bolted on to the existing appraisal
system. It is clear that very many staff feel that the system has been abused and
that they are now less likely to get the appropriate Box Marking. This belief is
obviously reinforced by the fact that the frequency of Box 1 and 2s has been
falling in recent years and is all the more damaging given the psychological
importance staff see their Box marking as having. 63% of our respondents agreed
that the personal satisfaction they derived from work was a sufficient incentive
for them to do what was necessary to get a Box 1 or 2; only 26% disagreed
(Question 43). The right Box marking is for many an important signal, confirming
them in their self-esteem and in their belief that they are doing their work to the
right level. For this to be jeopardised by a particular method of awarding
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performance related pay is potentially serious for management.
We are not suggesting that the appraisal system necessarily is unfair, does
operate a quota or is characterised by undue overruling from above. Our
information does not permit us to make an authoritative judgment on these
issues. But for staff motivation, what is important is what people think, and their
thoughts are heavily in a negative, cynical direction.
It is interesting that some of these worries find an echo in the final section of the
questionnaire, which was answered only by Reporting Officers, i.e. those who
carry out staff appraisals. Table 13 gives some results.
Reporting Officers obviously see the need for review by their superiors in order
to secure consistency between Officers. However, they also uneasy at the extent
of overruling; evidently they feel that more than mere consistency is involved
here. There is also a recognition that the financial link now raises problems; fully
33% expressed strong agreement with this viewpoint, which implies that the
increased difficulties are by no means trivial for the Officers concerned.
Table 13. Reporting Officer views on the appraisal system.
percentages
Yes No
The vetting of reports higher up is necessary 
to ensure consistency between 
Reporting Officers (Q74) 77 16
Performance Pay has made Reporting Officers 
feel uneasy because their assessments are 
overruled by someone higher up (Q73) 60 28
Performance Pay has made the appraisal system
harder to operate because it is now tied 
to money (Q75) 72 23
Our conclusion on this point is that the links between the appraisal system and
the Revenue's system of Performance Pay have alienated many staff. They may
well have helped to degrade a system which, for other purposes, was entirely
suitable. Further, the scepticism which staff are acquiring about the integrity of
the appraisal system provides a rational basis for the very limited motivational
- 24 -
improvement that Performance Pay has induced.
Expectancy theory provides one framework to assist in understanding why the
positive motivational response to performance related pay in the Inland Revenue
has been so muted. A second theory is Goal Setting Theory, which stresses the
importance of management setting clear, acceptable and achievable work goals.
Table 14 sets out some of our results.
Table 14. Staff views on work goals.
percentages
Yes No
Performance Pay has made supervisors
set work targets more clearly (Q13) 27 43
Performance Pay has raised staff awareness
of the appraisal system's objectives (Q10) 57 30
Performance Pay has had no effect on the
quality of my work because it was already
at the appropriate standard (Q24) 82 8
Communications between staff and
management have improved as a result of
Performance Pay (Q3) 9 72
These are rather mixed results. Goal setting theory predicts improved motivation
if goals are set more clearly, as long as the goals are agreed and achievable. The
responses to the first statement in Table 14 suggest only a modest improvement
in this respect; those to the second statement suggest a more widespread
improvement. Those to the other two statements, however, strongly imply no
change. Goals may be clearer but the vast majority of workers seem to feel that
they were already working to the appropriate standard. This may or not be true
in objective terms but even if it is not true, our results strongly imply that
management has not been able to convince their staff to the contrary. Without a
commitment to new and more appropriate goals, goal setting theory would
suggest a zero or very modest motivational impact.
Two further pieces of evidence which suggest the limitations on Performance Pay
to motivate staff are relevant for goal theory. The first comes from the responses
to Question 45, which indicate that 31% of staff believe that the nature of their job
makes it very hard for them to be awarded a Box Marking of 1 or 2. The second
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comes from the very last question on the survey (No. 77), which finds that no
fewer than 46% of the Reporting Officers agree that staff do not have sufficient
control over their work to make performance related pay a sensible idea. 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications.
Our findings in this Report are based on the views of a large and representative
survey of Inland Revenue staff. To our knowledge, it is the first study of
performance related pay of its kind for public sector white collar workers in the
UK. For this reason alone, it deserves to be taken seriously. It is given added
importance by the Government's declared intention of making performance
related pay a more important feature of public sector pay arrangements in the
future. Our conclusions deal first with the problems of performance pay at the
Inland Revenue, and then look more widely at the implications of this experience
for the Citizens' Charter.
Although the principle of relating pay to performance is widely accepted among
Inland Revenue staff, our results strongly suggest that the system as it has been
operated has had, at most, only a small positive motivational effect on staff. The
small effect is found both in staff replies on general motivation, and from detailed
questions relating to aspects of work that are assessed in the appraisal system.
Moreover, the small motivational effect is recorded both in the replies of
individual members of staff, and in the judgments of Reporting Officers
concerning the behaviour of staff. Finally, these small improvements have to be
set against certain negative consequences. The net effect on staff motivation could
well be negative. 
The positive motivational effects, such as they are, look to be somewhat greater
among short service staff and those in the lowest grades, and weaker amongst
longer service and more senior staff. We can only speculate on the reasons for
this finding, but three possibilities deserve consideration. First, the potential
rewards obtained from earning range points above the scale maximum are
greater, as a percentage of salary, for the junior grades than for Revenue
Executives and Inspectors. Secondly, the motivation of more junior staff may
benefit disproportionately from the greater clarity with which work objectives are
seen to have been set. Thirdly, it is possible that more senior workers are more
accustomed to, and accepting of, the Revenue's organisational norms, and so
perceive Performance Pay as a much more marginal influence on their own work
practices. Although we asked no question on this directly, we did ask people to
write in the main reason why Performance Pay had, or had not, made them
willing to improve the quantity and quality of their work. A very large number
of respondents volunteered that they always gave of their best, or always did
quality work. This suggests that there is a strong sense of what good work is in
the organisation, and that members of staff feel that they already conform to that
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norm. This is borne out by the very large number of the staff who replied that
their work was "already at the appropriate standard".
Why should Performance Pay have had so little general effect on motivation
when 57% the staff reported being favour of the principle? First, and most
importantly, it is widely judged to be unfair in its operation. Many staff believed
that there was a quota applied to the Box markings awarded, and that even if
their work were good enough, they would not be awarded a Box 1 or 2. Indeed,
among the latter, 80% believed that there was a quota in operation on Box
markings. About a third of the staff also believed that favouritism influenced Box
markings. Objective evidence to support staff views on this matter is provided by
the data on the incidence of Box 1 and 2 markings over the last four years. In this
context, it is not surprising that staff perceive that the appraisal system has been
twisted for purposes that have nothing to do with actual performance.
Another cause cited for the feeling of unfairness of operation was that the Box
marking takes insufficient account of job allocations, i.e. of the detailed tasks that
different staff are required to do. Further, about a third thought that their job
gave them little opportunity to achieve a Box 1 or 2. The latter view was given
support by the replies of reporting officers.
A possible line of argument from the Revenue's official side is that, in spite of this
reaction, Performance Pay has been successful. True, only a small fraction of the
staff seems to have been stimulated to perform better, but the cost of Performance
Pay in terms of the fraction of the overall pay bill paid out is also fairly small. In
net financial terms, it might have 'worked'. This may be correct, and certainly we
do not have the data to disprove it . However, one should also consider possible9
hidden costs in terms of loss of motivation elsewhere, and in the damage to
established management systems. Three main potential costs stand out: possible
damage to the work atmosphere; reduced staff confidence in the reporting
system; and reduced motivation among more senior and longer service staff.
Many of the staff believe that Performance Pay has caused some deterioration in
the atmosphere at work, reporting that it had caused staff jealousies and
contributed to a decline in morale. From our survey it is not possible to evaluate
the scale of such losses. Erosion of staff confidence in the reporting system is
attested by the widespread belief that a quota is in operation of Box markings so
that no matter how well people work, many would not be able to get
Performance Pay. As the reporting system has other important uses, including
clarifying staff's work objectives, and as high Box markings bring intrinsic
rewards, its discredit among the staff could be quite serious in the longer run.
Finally, it was observed earlier that longer service and staff in higher grades were
less likely to be motivated by Performance Pay than more junior staff. Although
our questions on motivation mainly asked whether Performance Pay had
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increased motivation, and strictly speaking even a strong "no" answer does not
imply actual loss of motivation, the possibility seems quite serious.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer has presented the extension of performance
related pay in the public sector as an important step in achieving the
Government's proposed Citizen's Charter, it being designed to make public
services more responsive to individual citizens. The experience of the Inland
Revenue's current scheme offers some indicators as to where Performance Pay
should be improved if it is to meet the Government's expectations. The scheme
in operation at the IRSF has a number of positive features in the eyes of staff.
Many accept its principle; it has lead to greater clarity in setting job targets for
some staff; and it has motivated some of the staff. However, it has a number of
serious drawbacks in its present form that will need to be attended to if it is to
meet the Government's hopes.
The most important of these is that if increased use of Performance Pay is to
succeed in making staff more motivated then it will be important both to increase
the amount of money involved and to overcome its perceived unfairness of
operation among staff. If this is not done, there is a clear danger that the scheme
could become steadily more counter-productive.
Performance Pay and the Citizens' Charter.
The central role attributed to performance related pay within the Citizens' Charter
as a means of improving public services and administration leads us to look at
the Inland Revenue experience in a wider context. The scheme at the Revenue has
many good characteristics, at least in principle: it is based on systematic
performance appraisal; markings are vetted for consistency by senior managers;
appraisals are open so that staff know how they have been evaluated. There is
also a degree of union involvement and information: there is provision for
appeals, and although a management initiative, it was introduced as part of a
collective agreement. Many other public services involve a similar mixture of
administrative and clerical duties and contact with the public, have broadly
similar types of salary systems, and types of performance pay. In common with
many parts of the public services, many staff at the Inland Revenue are
committed to their part of the service, and believe they are providing an
important public service. It is therefore reasonable to seek to draw a number of
more general lessons concerning the use of merit pay in the public sector.
Should individual payments be greater ?
Many of the staff felt that the amount of money an individual receives in merit
pay should be substantially increased. The same point was also raised in many
of the written in replies. It will be recalled that three successive box one
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appraisals enable merit increases of between 12% and 22% of the scale maximum
depending upon grade. However, the amount in any one year could be as little
as one sixth of this as two successive box twos give rise to the equivalent of half
an increment. Instead of the maximum of 12% or 22% obtained over three years,
the box two path would amount to only 6% or 11% over six years . Since10
obtaining two box twos is the most common way in which merit increments may
be earned, the majority of individual awards tend to be quite small (2%-4% over
two years).
The small size of most merit increments does not appear to be greatly at variance
with similar schemes elsewhere. Surveys of private sector schemes in France
reveal widespread use of merit pay (individualised pay increases) in recent years,
but similarly low levels of annual payment (Bangoura 1987 and MinistPre du
Travail, 1989). In Britain similarly low levels prevail for most non-managerial
employees (IRRR 398). Hence, if it is true that these schemes are working in the
private sector, then the size of merit payments to individual staff by the Revenue
may not necessarily be the cause of poor results.
Although the rationale for increasing the size of merit payments may seem
straightforward, it should be remembered that a large minority of the Revenue's
staff thought that it should not be increased. In addition, many of the staff had
found the scheme divisive, and many reporting officers said that it had made
operating the appraisal system more difficult. These problems, and there is no
reason to believe that they are confined to the Inland Revenue scheme, would
presumably become more acute if the amounts paid to individuals were to be
increased.
Should there be more beneficiaries?
An alternative to greater individual payments is to extend payments to more
staff. At present, under the Inland Revenue scheme, a little less than a half of staff
get box one or box two markings, and about four fifths of these would need to
get the same box marking or better in the next year if they were to qualify. These
four fifths would also need to be at the top of the scale for their grade. There are
therefore a substantial number of staff who work at the required standard for
merit pay, but are not eligible to receive it. This factor seems to have coloured the
perceptions of some staff, but the difference of judgement between those on their
scale maximum (and therefore eligible) and those not was too small to account
for more than a small part of the perceived unfairness of the scheme.
Apart from the increasing the number eligible by removing the restriction on
eligibility, merit pay could be extended to a larger number of staff, notably to
those who "fully meet the normal requirements of the grade". It was noted by the
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Top Salaries Review Body 1985 report that one of the dangers facing merit pay
for senior civil servants was that imposing a quota on payments could demotivate
the 'fully satisfactory performers who represent a large proportion of the
employees in any organisation' .11
Under the present Inland Revenue appraisal scheme, under 3% of staff are rated
as less than 'fully meeting the normal requirements' of their grade, so there is a
clear danger that simply extending merit pay to those obtaining box threes would
come very close to what the Chancellor described as disguised general pay
increases. Some other branches of the British public service have indeed agreed
to extend merit pay to those getting a succession of box threes. Effectively, such
merit pay schemes are a hybrid of a reward for above normal performance, and
one for length of service in the grade. Revenue staff were fairly evenly divided
on whether or not merit awards should be open to all satisfactory performers.
Extending performance pay in this way need not reward average and above
average performers equally.
Should there be more information sharing?
There is a severe problem of asymmetric information in performance appraisal
in many merit pay schemes both as concerns its distribution among staff, and the
overall amounts paid out. Management controls and applies the information
leading to appraisals. Although there is a limited appeals procedure, individual
staff agree each year a set of targets with their respective reporting officers, and
there are a number of specific criteria on which performance is appraised, the
process depends essentially upon judgements by managers, vetted by more senior
managers. In the Revenue, this has contributed to a significant number of the staff
complaining of favouritism by managers, and that management manipulated
appraisal markings by applying a quota.
Such problems are not peculiar to the Inland Revenue. Indeed, it has been argued
that the slowing of the spread of merit pay in France in the late 1980s was due
to union and worker attachment to existing pay systems (MinistPre du Travail
1989, and Sandoval 1991). In Italy unions have been leery of merit pay systems
because, in their view, their operation gave management too much discretion
(Della Rocca 1991).
The problem frequently lies less in the actual criteria for remuneration than in
how they are applied and monitored. Indeed, our study indicated that a majority
of the staff at the Revenue accepted the criteria implied by performance pay. In
most countries, unions and employers have long experience of agreeing the
criteria for remuneration, for example in job evaluation and job classification
systems. The problem with merit pay, unlike these other systems, lies in the
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informational asymmetry in favour of the employer that characterises most merit
pay systems.
Pay bargaining is an adversarial process, but its purpose is to establish an
agreement as to the area in which both parties can work together in good faith.
That cooperation can be jeopardised if it appears that one side is taking
advantage of its control of information to revise the terms of the agreement
unilaterally, thus violating that good faith. The simplest way of reassuring
employees and their representatives that the scheme is being operated in good
faith is to provide for joint monitoring of the allocation of merit increases, and to
have a strong appeals procedure so that individual employees feel they are being
fairly assessed.
Should there be a quota on payments?
There are clear budgetary reasons why an employer might choose to introduce
a quota on total merit payments under a new scheme. There is no way of
knowing in advance how the behaviour of even a long established appraisal
scheme onto which it is grafted might change. Even though senior managers
might have a firm view of the purposes of performance pay, local managers who
are responsible for motivating their staff could easily be tempted to award extra
increments in exchange for more cooperation. Indeed, senior managers could fear
that staff would threaten to reduce cooperation unless they were awarded better
markings. There are numerous instances of such small group bargaining pressures
on junior management, leading to an upward drift of payments, under piecework
and similar output incentive systems (eg. Brown 1973).
On the union side too, it is easy to imagine why a quota might be necessary. It
would be very difficult for a union negotiator to agree to a merit pay system in
which management had complete discretion over the size of the kitty. Thus, in
the 1988 agreement, the IRSF, the Inland Revenue, and the Treasury agreed an
overall guideline concerning the amounts that could be expected to be paid out
under merit pay. For the union it represented a minimum amount, and for
management, a ceiling .12
However desirable a quota may be for organisational reasons, there is a conflict
of ethic between performance appraisal and a budgetary limit on merit pay as
practised in the tax service. The logic of performance appraisal is tied to the
inherent quality and quantity of individual staff acts. There is no logical reason,
and no external limit preventing all of the staff getting excellent ratings
simultaneously, although it might be improbable. Yet the logic of a fixed quota
on merit payments is that even if all the staff work well above the requirements
of their grade, most would not get performance pay awards. Since the awards
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among those eligible are tied to their annual box markings, management could
only prevent the quota on merit pay being exceeded if there were a
corresponding quota on box markings.
Given the adversarial nature of bargaining relationships, the clear financial
pressures on public sector pay bills, and the asymmetry of information, it is not
surprising that many of the staff should suspect or fear that management
manipulates the appraisal system. Thus, many of our respondents believed that
staff were frequently denied the appraisal score they deserved because there was
a quota on box markings, and that good box markings were too frequently
overruled by more senior management.
Hence, although there are many good reasons for instituting a quota on
payments, the way it has been tied to the performance appraisal system in the
Inland Revenue, as in much of the rest of the Civil Service, threatens to
undermine trust in appraisal.
Should performance pay be self-financing?
The main argument on the management side for a quota on payments is caution,
even though with hindsight it would appear from much of the preceding
discussion that such caution has jeopardised the success of the scheme. Yet,
success in raising motivation and output raises the possibility that it could be self-
financing. In recent years, it appears that a number of private sector
manufacturing flexibility deals have contributed to higher productivity (Marsden
and Thompson 1990) and some more recent deals over working time reduction
in engineering appear to have given especially large productivity gains
(Richardson and Rubin 1991). Could not the public sector follow this example?
Doing away with a fixed quota, and insisting that merit pay be self-financing
might be another solution, using merit pay as a means of sharing the gains . The13
beneficiaries might be determined as currently, but the size of the kitty would be
variable. In this way, management would have no incentive to manipulate the
appraisal scores downwards, so the perceived unfairness might be less.
The main problems with this approach lie in the difficulty of measuring the gains
accruing to the Revenue in a manner that inspires the confidence of both staff and
higher management. Although some quantitative targets are used, they are not
the only ones set for the Revenue (eg. quality of service in the Citizens' Charter),
and the latter are not easily measured. In addition, the direct impact of
performance pay is harder to identify than that of changing a specified set of
working practices, such as ending particular job demarcations. 
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However, it is possible that these objections are overstated. Much of the
administrative work of the Inland Revenue, as of other branches of Public
Administration, lends itself to quantitative indicators. Indeed, managers within
the Revenue already work to a number of quantitative targets such as post to be
cleared by their office. Some elements of quality of service are also amenable to
quantification, such as the number of errors in dealing with tax returns, the
length of time tax payers are kept waiting for replies, and the amount of advice
available. Secondly, measuring the impact of performance pay on output is
probably easier in a large bureaucracy with a relatively constant flow of work
than in an engineering firm with a highly volatile market.
For management then, it might have been better to avoid fixing a quota, which
gives the appearance of setting a corresponding quota on appraisals, and to
concentrate more on measuring whatever dimensions of output, quantitative or
qualitative, that it felt were more important.
Separate performance appraisal from merit pay?
The case for a separate merit pay appraisal system rests on three observations: the
need for systematic appraisal; the potential damage to established appraisal
systems; and their inadequacy for merit pay purposes.
To have a merit pay system without a systematic appraisal system has many
dangers. Simple, uncontrolled supervisory ratings are notoriously unreliable
(Bishop 1987). The experience of the Italian public service with group
performance pay suggests that they can easily degenerate into length of service
payments (Dell'Aringa 1992). There are strong day-to-day pressures on
management simply to reward all staff equally as they otherwise have to justify
differential rewards to those on whose daily cooperation they depend.
Given the need therefore for systematic appraisal, in many organisations it must
be tempting to reduce costs by using an established system of performance
appraisal for merit pay rather than setting up wholly new, additional, procedures
for performance assessment. Hence, one can understand the attraction of using
the Revenue's existing system of appraisal. However, the discussion so far
illustrates a number of respects in which a new merit pay system can damage an
established appraisal system.
We do not know what staff thought of the performance appraisal system before
merit pay was introduced at the Revenue, but the spirit of the replies to our
questionnaire suggests that staff confidence in its fairness has been reduced by
the introduction of performance pay. The most telling questions were those on
whether staff thought there was a quota on good appraisals, and the doubt in the
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minds of many staff that they would get performance pay even if their work were
sufficient to merit the qualifying appraisal score.
Thirdly, it is likely that the current appraisal system is ill-suited to merit pay.
That most staff should be appraised in the good or very good categories is not
uncommon in appraisal systems. The system used in the French public
administration has been widely characterised by 'over-marking' producing, in a
number of services, an average appraisal score of 18/20 (Verrier 1989 quoted in
Meurs 1992), which implies at most two grades for above average performers,
and also that the number of bad scores was very low. The restricted number of
grades of performance effectively used means that either many staff who are
working up to the requirements of their job get no merit pay, or the merit pay
scheme risks collapsing into a general length of service award.
An appraisal scheme for managerial purposes has rather different objectives from
one designed for merit pay. The way the scheme works in the Inland Revenue,
as in much of British Public Administration, it serves to clarify the work targets
of individual members of staff, and to enable management to give staff
informative feedback on how well they have achieved their objectives, to discuss
any weaknesses, and how they might be resolved, and to assist in staff
development and promotion. Such personal communication between managers
and those they manage is extremely important, but does not require detailed
scoring. The critical task is to ensure that staff know whether they are doing their
job properly, and are encouraged to do better. This requires provision of detailed
information rather than allocation of a large number of grades. Moreover, if
management is competent there should be very few staff working below the
requirements of their job.
For pay purposes, the earlier discussion suggests that the three grades effectively
used within the Revenue's current performance appraisal scheme are too broad
to give much opportunity for merit pay to the majority of fully satisfactory
performers. If it is not to contain a strong seniority element, merit pay would
seem to require, at the very least, greater differentiation among staff in this
category. This may not suit the other managerial purposes of appraisal.
Thus, there seems to be a case for having a separate appraisal system for merit
pay from that used for general management purposes. There is in any case, in the
Revenue as in many other organisations, a separate review system for promotion.
It would of course require more management time which has to be considered
against the other demands on management.
A separate merit pay appraisal system would also avoid the conflict of logic
between having a fixed kitty for disbursement and the possibility that the
performance of the great majority could improve. For this to work, the size of
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individual payments as well as the number of recipients could vary.
Concentrate on fewer objectives for improved performance?
The current appraisal system at the Revenue evaluates thirteen specific items, and
additionally demands an overall assessment that is related to, but is not derived
from them by any mechanical formula. Thus, it would seem that merit pay is
meant to improve every, but not any particular, aspect of performance. This could
well explain the perplexity felt by many staff, that they had not enough scope to
improve their performance, and also that they felt that merit pay was really
concerned about quantity only: getting post cleared. From the replies to our
survey, if management had been aiming at encouraging other objectives than
quantity, the message had not got through to the staff.
Mostly, people improve performance by concentrating on a small number of
features at a time, diverting effort from other items until particular objectives
have been achieved. It would appear from our replies, that for many staff
performance pay had not led to clearer objectives being set.
More attention to scope to earn PP?
A common complaint, noted both in the written in replies, and in answer to
specific questions, is that many staff feel that their current jobs do not give them
sufficient scope to earn performance pay. This is no doubt an important source
of perceived exclusion and unfairness, and contributes to the demotivation
experienced by some staff. In many administrative jobs, tight management and
tight quantitative output targets leave little scope for individual variation. In the
written in replies, many staff reported that they were already working as hard as
they could.
Two contributors to perceived unfairness to be avoided.
After completion of our survey, it was reported that the merit pay scheme in
operation at the Inland Revenue had recorded a considerable underspend
compared with the ceiling set in the agreement. In addition, more evidence
became available that the number of box one and box two appraisals awarded
had declined since merit pay was introduced in 1988 .14
At the time of our questionnaire, therefore, this underspend can have been felt
by staff only in an impressionistic way. They could have felt that good appraisals
had become less frequent, and that they seemed to have a less than one in four
chance of getting merit pay, but the reality underlying such impressions was not
confirmed. Although our survey could not probe the effect of publication of this
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information, it is likely to prove very damaging for staff confidence in the fairness
not just of this particular appraisal system, but of all those currently being
developed within the British public sector. The shortfall on the 25% may have
been unintended and unanticipated by management, but it is the perception of
the staff and their representatives that is critical for any motivational effects of
merit pay. As mentioned earlier, the adversarial nature of pay bargaining, the
information asymmetry of appraisals, and the underlying feeling of unfairness
and distrust vis-B-vis merit pay revealed in our survey, mean that such
underpayment is almost bound to foster an atmosphere to suspicion and
cynicism.
Two solutions can be suggested. The first is to ensure that the quota is fully used,
and the second is to go further towards joint union-management supervision of
the appraisal and merit pay systems. 
Some arguments have already been put forward for doubting the efficacy of a
quota system because of perceived effects upon the appraisal process. If some
kind of guidepost for the amount to be dispersed is unavoidable, then great care
is needed to ensure that it is actually used. Failure to do so will inevitably lead
to suspicion of bad faith or at least incompetence .15
Another way in which greater confidence can be restored in appraisal is for there
to be greater joint union-management supervision, especially of those parts
connected with merit pay. The purpose of the joint supervision would not be to
follow individual decisions, except in cases of appeal, but rather to ensure that
the outcomes overall coincided with the spirit of the agreement. In other words,
staff should be able to see that justice was being been done. Currently,
management share a good deal of information with the IRSF on the progress of
the performance pay scheme and on appraisals. However, more detailed and
systematic joint monitoring from an early date could have led to corrective action
being taken at an early date, thus ensuring a higher degree of staff confidence in
the scheme.
Unless staff confidence in the fairness of public service merit pay schemes can be
assured, it is hard to imagine, on the basis of our evidence, that they will
contribute much to staff motivation. Indeed, there is a real danger that they may
prove counter-productive.
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 More precisely, the 1988 Agreement led to its introduction for the staff grades1.
covered in our analysis; these refer to virtually all the Revenue staff but exclude
the most senior staff.
 These figures were published in IRSF Assessment Pay Special, September, 1991;2.
the data are very slightly at variance with those in Table 1.
. Under the agreement with the IRSF, there are in fact two pay spines, A and B,3.
which are staggered, so that the equivalent of a half increment in some other pay
systems is achieved by movement to the next highest point of the other spine.
Thus Box 1s are rewarded with a linear upward progression along their current
pay spine, whereas Box 2s progress by zig-zagging between the two spines.
. Over time, staff may combine performance awards for Box 1s and two4.
consecutive Box 2s, but may obtain no more than three awards on each
criterion, subject to the maximum additional reward under Performance Pay
of three range points up the spine containing the member of staff's scale
maximum.
. According to the 1988 Pay Agreement, range points may be withdrawn on a5.
mark-time basis if two Box 4 overall performance markings (or below) are
received in a period of three years (Para 13 v).
 In our questionnaire, we asked for responses on a five point scale, from strongly6.
disagree, to disagree, to no view, to agree and to strongly agree. For convenience
of presentation, we have combined strongly disagree with disagree, and strongly
agree with agree. We have also ignored the no views, so that the percentages do
not add up to 100. Finally, the statements in the Tables do not always correspond
word for word with those in the questionnaire, again for convenience of
expression; in each case we provide the number of the statement in the
questionnaire for reference.
.  Even then it does not seem to be the case that Reporting Officers are required7.
to give an overall Box marking that is a simple average of the individual
elements. Not only may certain elements be given a higher weight than others,
additional factors may be taken into account.
. As before, to make the presentation clearer, we have combined those who8.
agreed with those who strongly agreed. 
Endnotes.
- 37 -
.  Neither, we suspect, do management.9.
. It is in fact possible for staff to obtain a combination of performance increments10.
under both box ones and box twos, and someone obtaining six box twos could
still obtain an additional performance increment should a box one marking be
obtained. The absolute ceiling would however remain that of three range points
above the scale maximum.
. Para 24..."we said we were keenly aware that if employers were to stay11.
competitive, they needed to motivate not just the highest performers, for whom
promotion prospects were normally a powerful incentive, but also the fully
satisfactory performers who represent a large proportion of the employees in any
organisation...we recommended that...the then existing 25 per cent 'quota' on the
numbers of staff who could receive one or more discretionary increments at any
one time should be increased to 35 per cent...."
Review Body of Top Salaries, Report no. 29, Thirteenth Report on Top Salaries.
Cm 938, Feb. 1990. HMSO, London.
. The origin of the 25% figure in the quota remains obscure to the authors. 
12.
It did not seem to have been based upon detailed estimates of the amounts that
would be paid out for above average performance. Indeed, the similarity with the
25% figure then prevailing in some other public service schemes may be due
more to imitation than to calculation. In fact, the quota actually fixed in the IRSF
agreement is not a single number, but a range. The lowest figure would be if 25%
of the staff got a second box 2, giving about half the total that would apply if 25%
got box 1 awards. Equally, the 25% rule makes no explicit statement as to the
distribution of awards across grades. Hence, the 25% figure leaves a good deal of
latitude as to the actual monetary size of the quota.
. A potential problem is that whereas many of the private sector examples of13.
productivity deals have led to one-off increases in productivity, as a result of a
reorganisation of work, the goals of merit pay in the Revenue appear to be more
oriented towards encouraging more individuals to achieve above average
performance on a continuous basis.
. IRSF Assessment, Pay Special, 23 Sept. 1991, Vol. 12, no.9. Based on figures14.
made available by management, the IRSF reported that the shortfall in1980-90 had
been about ,6m. and in 1990-91, about ,4m,respectively about 60% and about 45%
of the amount that the union calculated should have been paid out.
. The rules for attributing merit pay and the amounts concerned may have been15.
too rigid. While all or part of the underspend may possibly have been caused by
the decline in good box markings, it is also possible that it was due to getting the
sums wrong. Once the rules for eligibility and size of payments were set,
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management could do nothing to ensure the quota was met except to vary the
box markings. Hence, if a quota is to be used, it would seem important to have
more variable payment rules to ensure that it can be used up.
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Appendix 1
The Questionnaire and the Basic Frequencies.
  Part 1-- First, we would like your response to some arguments that are made about Performance Pay . 
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
1) The principle of relating pay to performance in
the Revenue is a good one 14 26 3 47 10
2) The idea of Performance Pay is fundamentally 
unfair 11 47 7 25 11
3) Communications between staff and management have 
been improved as a result of Performance Pay 22 50 20 8 1
4) Performance Pay has made staff less willing to assist
colleagues experiencing work difficulties 7 46 19 22 6
5) The trouble with Performance Pay is that a good
appraisal by the Reporting Officer is too often
overruled by someone higher up 2 14 20 41 22
6) Part time staff lose out on Performance Pay 4 24 46 20 6
7)  On balance, for all its faults, it's better to have
Performance Pay than not 15 29 7 42 7
8) For all that's said about quality, Performance Pay is
mostly a device to get more post cleared 4 27 13 38 17
9) People get a good Box Marking not so much because of
their performance but because managers want to
reward their favourites 12 33 20 23 12
10) Performance Pay has raised staff awareness of
the Reporting System's objectives 4 24 15 51 6
11) Staff are frequently denied the Box Marking they 
deserve because there is a quota system in Box Markings 2 8 15 38 36
12) Performance Pay has made staff question the fairness
of the Reporting System 1 4 9 52 35
13) Performance Pay has made supervisors set 
work targets more clearly 6 37 30 25 2
14) Performance Pay has caused jealousies 
between staff 2 19 17 41 21
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15) Performance Pay has meant that good work is at last 
recognised and rewarded 14 36 8 32 9
16) Performance Pay has helped to undermine staff 
morale 3 22 18 35 20
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  Part 2. Now, we would like to know how the existence of the Performance Pay  arrangements have affected
you personally; a number of the following statements draw on the language of your Appraisal Form. 
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
17) The existence of Performance Pay has given me an 
incentive to work beyond the requirements of my job 17 53 9 18 3
18) Performance Pay has reduced my wish to  co-operate 
with management 16 59 16 8 2
19) The system of Performance Pay has made me want 
to show more initiative in my job 10 51 11 24 3
20) The existence of Performance Pay has encouraged
me to give sustained high performance at work 12 51 11 23 4
21) Performance Pay has made promotion seem 
more distant 3 29 25 28 15
22) Performance Pay has given me a greater incentive
to get my work priorities right 12 52 15 20 2
23) The existence of Performance Pay has made me 
more aware of the importance of being sensitive 
to my workmates 13 50 23 13 1
24) The Performance Pay system has had no effect on the 
quality of my work because it was already at the 
appropriate standard 1 7 11 55 27
25) Performance Pay has given me an incentive to express
myself at work with greater clarity 12 55 19 12 1
26) Performance Pay has made me more willing to voice
criticisms of management's instructions 10 52 23 13 2
27) Performance Pay has given me an incentive to be 
more effective in my dealings with the public 13 55 25 8 1
28) The existence of Performance Pay has made me 
more willing to work harder 18 53 10 16 2
29) Performance Pay has made me more reluctant to 
change my job in the office 12 51 21 13 4
30) The system of Performance Pay has significantly 
raised my motivation at work 24 52 12 11 1
31) The existence of Performance Pay has made me 
willing to improve the quality of my work 25 55 8 11 1
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32) The existence of Performance Pay has made me 
willing to increase the quantity of work I do 24 54 9 12 2
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  Part 3 -- Now we would like your response to some new criteria that could be used when awarding
Box Markings or Performance Pay . 
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
33) It would be better to base Performance Pay on the 
performance of groups of staff rather than of individuals 27 44 10 15 4
34) It would be fair for management to award Performance 
Pay just to prevent a competent officer from leaving 36 48 6 9 2
35) It would be fair for management to award Performance 
Pay to someone who has been loyal and hardworking but 
has only met the requirements of the grade 11 32 12 37 8
36) The amount of money an individual gets from a 
Performance Pay award should be substantially increased 10 21 28 27 14
37) The Box Marking should take more account of the
different job allocations 2 7 14 54 24
Part 4 --  Now we would like some reactions to your latest Report.
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
38) I understand why I was awarded my most recent
Box Marking 4 10 7 69 10
39) My most recent Box Marking was a fair reflection of
my performance 7 20 7 57 9
40) I know what I have to do to get a Box 1 or 2 in 
the future 6 18 11 57 9
41) I am personally capable of doing what is necessary 
to get a Box 1 or 2 in the future 1 5 13 59 22
42) The financial reward from a Performance Pay award
is a sufficient incentive to make me do what is 
necessary to get a Box 1 or 2 21 50 12 14 3
43) The personal satisfaction I derive from my work 
is sufficient incentive for me to do what is needed 
to get a Box 1 or 2 7 19 11 45 18
44) Even if my performance is good enough to merit a
Box 1 or 2, I doubt that I will be given one 6 34 14 27 18
-  44 -
45) The nature of my present job makes it very hard 
for me to get a Box 1 or 2 8 45 16 21 10
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Part 5-- Now we would like to know something about your general attitudes, first to the Inland
Revenue as a whole and then to the office in which you presently work .
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
46) I feel "part of the family" in my present office 6 20 13 54 8
 
47) I feel a strong sense of commitment to my 
present office 5 20 17 48 10
48) I do not feel "emotionally attached" to my 
present office 5 31 18 38 7
49) I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career 
with the Inland Revenue 10 18 20 43 10
50) I feel "part of the family" at the Inland Revenue 11 30 25 31 4
51) I think that I could easily become as attached to
another organisation as I am to the Inland Revenue 2 14 26 50 8
52) I do not feel "emotionally attached" to the Inland
Revenue 3 20 19 44 14
53) Being in the Inland Revenue means a great deal  to me 9 27 33 26 4
54) By working in the Inland Revenue, I feel that I am
contributing to an important public service 4 15 19 53 9
55) I feel a strong sense of commitment to the 
Inland Revenue 8 24 27 35 6
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Part 6-- Finally, we would like some personal information .
56) Are you Male/Female?
36/64%
57) What is your current job grade?                 





vi)    7%
58) Do you work Full time/Part time?
88/12%
59) How long have you worked for the Inland Revenue?
<5 years -- 24%
5 to 9 years --21%
10 to 14 years --19%
15 to 19 years -- 16%
20 or more --21%
60) How long have you been in your current job grade? 
< 2 years -- 29%
2 to 5 years --16%
more than 5 years --46%
61) What was your latest overall Performance Box Marking?   
1    -- 6%
2  -- 36%
3  -- 50%
4 -- 0.3%
5 -- 0.1%
Not known -- 6%
62) Are you below the maximum of your pay scale? Yes/No
31/69%
63) Have you received a Performance Pay award? Yes/No
35/65%
64) What was your latest Promotability Marking?  
Exceptionally Fitted -- 6%
Fitted -- 21%
Likely to become Fitted-- 16%
Not Fitted --15%
Not Known --42%
65) Do you work in Taxes/Collection?
83/17%
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66) In which of the following regions do you work?
Eastern Counties -- 9%
Greater Manchester --9%











This extra section of the survey should be filled out only if you are also a Reporting Officer.  
Strongly No
Strongly
Disagree Disagree View Agree
Agree
67) The existence of Performance Pay has caused many of 
the staff to work beyond the requirements of their job 11 68 6 13 2
68) It has reduced the wish of many of the staff to  
co-operate with management 8 57 15 18 2
69) It has led to many of the staff giving sustained high 
performance at work 11 66 9 12 2
70) It has helped to increase the quality of the work 
of many of the staff 13 69 7 10 0
71) It has led to an increase in the quantity of work 
many of the staff do 9 62 7 19 3
72) It has made many of the staff more committed to 
their work 14 65 9 12 0
73) It has made Reporting Officers feel uneasy because 
their assessments of staff are overruled by 
someone higher up 5 23 13 45 15
74) The vetting of reports higher up is necessary to ensure 
consistency between Reporting Officers 4 12 7 62 15
75) Performance Pay has made the Reporting System 
much harder to operate because the Box Marking 
is now tied to money 4 19 5 39 33
76) The system of Performance Pay has led to you to 
take more work home 21 54 8 11 7
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77) Performance Pay is a bad idea because not 
enough staff have sufficient control over their 
work to change their ways 6 32 16 32 14
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Appendix 2
Methodological checks on our responses.
4,000 questionnaires were sent out in June 1991, stratified by job grade, to staff in the
Taxes and Collection sections of the Inland Revenue. 2,423 usable replies were returned.
The questionnaires were sent and returned via the Revenue's internal mail system, though
a handful of returns were received directly by us at the LSE.
The figures below show compare the population and sample values by a variety of












































d) Length of service.
How long have you worked for the Inland Revenue?
Population Sample
<5 years 28 24
5 to 9 years 20 21
10 to 14 years 18 19
15 to 19 years 16 16
20 or more 18 21
We were also concerned by the possibility that we might have received an un
representative response by Box Marking. We cannot be sure on this because up to date
figures on the distribution of Box Markings by grade were not available to us. One source
refers to 1988, and is used in the comparison below. As noted in the text, some figures
suggest that the incidence of Box 1 and 2s has fallen over the years, for all grades. This
increases the representativeness of our sample.
Actual figures for 1988 in normal type, LSE 1991 sample in italics.
Box 1 Box 2 Box 3 Box 4 Box 5 NK
Inspector (S) 11.5 61.0 27.0 0.5 -
7.5 50.4 42.1 0.0 0.0 1.3
Inspector 6.0 49.0 43.5 1.5 -
5.4 41.7 53.0 0.0 0.0 2.9
RE 5.0 45.0 48.0 2.0 -
4.4 40.4 54.6 0.3 0.2 4.7
RO 4.5 37.5 55.5 2.5 -
8.1 36.9 54.7 0.4 0.0 3.8
RA 14.0 42.5 41.5 1.5 -
6.9 36.6 55.7 0.6 0.0 16.2
Total 7.0 43.0 48.0 2.0 -
6.8 38.5 54.2 0.4 0.1 7.3
RO Male 5.0 34.9 57.5 2.1 0.5
7.6 33.3 58.6 1.0 0.0 1.8
RO Female 4.7 37.7 56.3 1.1 0.2
8.4 38.0 53.4 0.2 0.0 4.7
NK: box marking not known.
Source: IRSF Assessment Dec. 1990, based on data provided by the Inland Revenue (Table E1-4), and
LSE sample survey.
On the whole, the sample box markings are not very distant from the figures for 1988. It is
our understanding, however, that the proportion of staff given Box 1s or 2s fell somewhat
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after 1988. If so, the fit between our sample data and the population values is likely to be
even better.
Overall, we have no reason to doubt the representativeness of the sample data. For none
of the characteristics against which we are able to make a check is there an appreciable
gap. 
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